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NUMBER 1 
NOTES 
"Bright Line," "Substantial 
Participation," or Something Else: 
Who is a Primary Violator 
Under Rule lOb-5? 
By RODNEY D. CHRISMAN' 
INTRODUCfION 
Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,1 secondary actors' were frequently held liable for violations of 
• J.D. expected 2001, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank 
Professor Rutheford B Campbell, Jr. for his suggestions and advice and Jason 
Coltharp for his editorial help. He would also like to thank his family for their 
unwavering love and support, and, most of all, his beautiful wife and daughters for 
adding the wonder and joy that make life worthwhile. 
J Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164 (1994). 
2 Generally speaking, the issuer of a security is termed the "primary actor." 
Although the term "secondary actor" can include parties such as officers, directors, 
and indenture trustees (among others), the term is more commonly used to refer to 
parties such as lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and investment bankers. For 
purposes of this Note, the tenn "secondary actors" encompasses all of these parties. 
These so-called "secondary actors" have traditionally been held liable under 
various theories of secondary liability, cbaracterized by Professor Daniel Fischel 
as ''judicially implied civil liability which has been imposed on defendants who 
have not themselves been held to have violated the express prohibition of the 
securities statute at issue, but who have some relationship with the primary 
wrongdoer." Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Act of 1934,69 CAL. L. REv. 80,80 n.4 (1981). 
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section I O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act ofl934 ("section 1O(b )"? and 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rule I Ob-S ("rule IOb-S")4 
on a theory of aiding and abetting primary violators.' In Central Bank 0/ 
Denver, the Supreme Court ended this practice by holding that, based on 
the statutory language of section 1O(b), there is no private aiding and 
abetting cause of action under rule IOb-S.6 With no private aiding and 
abetting cause of action, the Court reasoned that secondary actors can only 
be liable for a violation of section I O(b) and rule IOb-S if they meet the 
requirements of a primary violation.7 
Before this decision, the question whether a secondary actor was a 
primary violator or merely an aider and abettor was "largely academic,"8 
because every federal circuit recognized the aiding and abetting cause of 
action.' Accordingly, the courts had not developed a clear standard for 
determining when a secondary actor's conduct rose to the level of a 
primary violation. After Central Bank a/Denver, however, the lower courts 
and commentators have struggled to defme the point at which a secondary 
actor's conduct becomes a primary violation. lO 
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). 
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2000). 
5 See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521,526 (5th Cir. 1992); Camp v. 
Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1991); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 
1478,1483 (9thCir. 1991); Rossv. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 820 (2d Cir. 1990);Aian 
R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A 
Critical Examination, 52 ALB. 1. REV. 637 (1988); William H. Kuehnle, Secondary 
Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, 
Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory 
Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 321-22 (1989). 
6 Cent. Banko/Denver, 511 U.S. at 191. 
7Id. , 
8 In re MTC Elecs. Tech. S'ho1ders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 985 (E.D.N.Y. 
1995), vacated illpart on reconsideration by, 993 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
'Cent. Banko/Denver, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
10 See Robert S. De Leon, The Fault Lines Between Primary Liability and 
Aiding and Abetting Claims Under Rule 1 Ob-5, 22 J. CORP. 1. 723, 729-33 (1997); 
Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line 
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section IO(b), 75 N.C. L. REv. 
691,723-26 (1997); see, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 
(2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); Dannenberg v. PaineWebber 
Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 
1994); In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. 
Mass. 1994); Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862F. Supp.1371, 1378 (E.D.Pa. 
1994); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 966 (C.D. Cal. 1994); cf. 
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This Note analyzes the competing theories currently used by courts and 
commentators to determine when a secondary actor's conduct rises to the 
level of a primary violation and proposes a workable and logical standard 
that can be used to differentiate a primary violation from mere aiding and 
abetting. Part I of the Note discusses the decision in Central Bank of 
Denver and the resulting dilemma that faced the lower courts in 
determining when a secondary actor is a primary violator. II Part II provides 
an analytical discussion of the emergence of two tests often used to 
determine whether a secondary actor is a primary violator: the "bright line" 
and "substantial participation" tests.i2 Finally, Part ill discusses the 
elements of a primary violation of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 as they 
relate to a secondary actor and proposes a workable and logical test to 
determine when a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a primary 
violation.13 
I. CENTRAL BANK OF DENVER AND ITS WAKE 
Central Bank of Denver was an indenture trustee I. for a bond issue by 
the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority ("Author-
ity"). IS The bonds required that certain land held subject to their liens be 
worth at least 160% of the total outstanding principal and interest on the 
bonds.16 AmWest Development was required to issue a written annual 
report to Central Bank of Denver evaluating whether the 160% test was 
being met. 17 Following Am West's 1988 appraisal, Central Bank of Denver 
leamed that there was a substantial possibility that the test was not being 
Fischel, supra note 2, at 82 (interpreting pre-19Bl Supreme Court decisions as 
indicating "that the theory of secondary liability is no longer viable"). 
II See infra notes 14-31 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 32-112 and accompanying text. 
IJ See infra notes 113-36 and accompanying text. 
14 An indenture trustee can be thought of as a "third party administrator" of the 
debt contract (the "indenture"). 3 THOMAS LEE HAzEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.1, at 144 (3d ed. 1995). The indenture sets out the 
rights and duties of all the parties involved, including the duties of the indenture 
trustee, which is usually a bank that acts as the agent for the individual public bond 
holders and whose duties often include monitoring the terms of the indenture. 
IS Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 167 (1994). 
16 [d. 
17 [d. 
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met, but, on the encouragement of AmWest, waited to perform an 
independent review of the land value appraisals. IS Before that independent 
review was ever performed, however, the Authority defaulted on the 
bonds. 19 The plaintiff bond purchasers sued Central Bank of Denver, 
Am West, the Authority, and others, but the case before the Supreme Court 
involved primarily whether Central Bank of Denver could be held liable as 
an aider and abettor.2o 
In determining whether a private cause of action existed for aiding and 
abetting under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court focused on 
the language of the statute. Section lO(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange---
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
[SEC] may prescribe?1 
By its text, section lO(b) is not self-executing, but instead depends upon 
"such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe"22 to carry it into 
action. In accordance with this authority, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5, 
which provides as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
l'Id. at 167-68. 
19 !d. at 168. 
2°Id. 
21 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b} (1994). 
"Id. 
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.23 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, began his analysis by stating that 
"[w]ith respect ... to ... the scope of the conduct prohibited by § lO(b), 
the text of the statute controls our decision ... 24 He went on to hold: 
In § 1O(b), Congress prohibited manipulative or deceptive acts in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. It envisioned that the 
SEC would enforce the statutory prohibition through administrative and 
injunctive actions. Of course, a private plaintiff now may bring suit 
against violators of § lO(b). But the private plaintiff may not bring a 
lOb-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 
lO(b) . ... We have refused to allow IOb-5 challenges to conduct not 
prohibited by the text of the statute.25 
Following this logic, the Court reasoned that because the text of section 
1 O(b) does not reach aiding and abetting, there is no aiding and abetting 
cause of action under section lO(b)?6 Consequently, there could be no 
aiding and abetting cause of action under rule lOb-5 because the rule could 
not exceed the authority of the statute.27 
Although unnecessary to the resolution of the case, the Court 
proceeded to the next step in a section 10(b) analysis, which is to "attempt 
to infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had the 
10b-5 [cause of] action been included as an express provision in the 1934 
Act.' .. 28 Under this analysis, the Court compared the implied cause of 
action under rule 10b-5 with the express causes of action in the 1934 Act. 
Based on this comparison, the Court concluded: 
From the fact that Congress did not attach private aiding and abetting 
liability to any of the express causes of action in the securities Acts, we 
23 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (2000). 
24 Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 173. 
25 ld. (emphasis added). 
26 ld. at 177 (ult is inconsistent with settled methodology in § 1O(b) cases to 
extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text."). 
271d. at 173. 
" ld. at 178 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 
508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993». 
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can infer that Congress likely would not have attached aiding and abetting 
liability to § 1O(b) had it provided a private § 1O(b) cause of action.29 
Even though the Supreme Court unambiguously eliminated the private 
cause of action for section I O(b) aiding and abetting violations, the Court 
did not let secondary actors off the hook altogether. The Court reasoned: 
Because the text of § I O(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we 
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit 
under § 1O(b). The absence of § 1O(b) aiding and abetting liability does 
not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free 
from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a 
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes 
a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of 
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under lOb·5, assuming 
all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule IOb·5 are met. In 
any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple 
violators; in litis case, for example, respondents named four defendants as 
primary violators.3D 
Thus, while the Court provided a definitive answer that there is no aiding 
and abetting cause of action under section I O(b) and rule lOb·5, its opinion 
raised another question that has perhaps proved more perplexing for the 
lower courts: when does a secondary actor's conduct rise to the level of a 
primary violation?31 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF Two TESTS TO DETERMINE WHEN A 
SECONDARY ACTOR'S CONDUCT RISES TO THE LEVEL OF A 
PRJMARY VIOLATION OF SECTION IO(B) AND RULE 
IOB·5 AFTER CENTRAL BANK OF DENVER 
Following the Central Bank of Denver decision, commentators and 
lower courts have struggled to delineate the point at which a secondary 
29 ld. at 179. 
30 ld. at 191 (citations omitted) (frrst emphasis added). 
31 That this question has proved more perplexing than aiding and abetting liabi· 
lity is illustrated by the relative difficulties that courts have encountered in 
answering the two questions. Prior to Central Bank o/Denver, every federal circuit 
had concluded that an aiding and abetting cause of action existed under section 
10(b) and rule IOb·5. ld. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Conversely, the federal 
circuits have had a much more difficult time agreeing when a secondary actor's 
conduct rises to the level of a primary violation. See infra notes 32·112 and 
accompanying text. 
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actor's conduct rises to the level of it primary violation. Courts and 
commentators addressing this issue have most commonly applied one of 
two tests:32 the "bright line" or the "substantial participation" test.33 
A. The "Bright Line" Test 
Many courts have interpreted Central Bank a/Denver to mean that, to 
be a primary violator under section IO(b) and rule IOb-5, the secondary 
actor must actually make the material misstatement or omission.34 This 
view reflects the "bright line" test?' 
In re Kendall Square Research Corporation Securities Litigation36 
provides an example of the use of the "bright line" test. In Kendall Square, 
plaintiffs brought suit against several defendants, alleging "losses as a 
result of materially misleading statements of revenues from the sale of 
[Kendall Square Research Corporation's] high performance parallel 
computer systems."3' All of the defendants settled except for Price 
Waterhouse, one of the "big five" accounting firms, and the company's 
auditor.38 The complaint alleged that Price Waterhouse violated section 
1O(b) and rule lOb-5 by (1) reviewing and approving inaccurate fmancial 
reports for the company, (2) issuing an unqualified audit opinion39 on the 
12See. e.g., Wrightv.Ernst&YoungLLP, 152F.3d 169, 175 (2dCir. 1998), 
urt. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re 
Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re 
Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994); 
Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'!, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994); In re 
ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 966 (C.D. Cal. 1994); De Leon, supra 
note 10, at 729-33; Prentice, supra note 10, at 725. 
33 Courts and commentators have not used the same nomenclature. This Note's 
use of "bright line" and "substantial participation" was inspired by the Second 
Circuit's discussion in Wright, 152 F.3d at 175. 
34 See id.; Kendall Square, 868 F. Supp. at 28; Vosgericlzian, 862 F. Supp. at 
1378. 
3S See Wright, 152 F.3d at 175. 
36 Kendall Square, 868 F. Supp. at 26. 
37Id. at 27. 
3, Id. 
39 An unqualified audit opinion is a type of audit opinion that states that the 
company's financial statements comply with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles ("GAAP") and that the audit was performed in accordance with 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS") with no significant scope 
linJitations on the audit. It is also known as a "clean" audit opinion. O. RAy 
WHITTINGTON & KURT PANY, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 678-79 (12th ed. 1998). 
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company's fmancial statements, and (3) reviewing and approving 
misleading representations made in the company's prospectuses for stock 
offerings.40 
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
refused to dismiss the claim that Price Waterhouse could be held liable as 
a primary violator of section 1 O(b) and rule lOb-5 for its unqualified audit 
opinion on fmancial statements containing material misstatements of 
revenuesY Although the court failed to fully explain why it refused to 
dismiss the claim,42 it seems logical that if Price Waterhouse's statements 
in its unqualified audit opinion suggesting that Kendall Square's fmancial 
statements were prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles ("GAAP") turned out to be false, then Price 
Waterhouse could be held liable as a primary violator, provided the other 
elements of a primary violation were present. 
On the other hand, the court found Price Waterhouse immune from 
liability for reviewing and approving the company's quarterly financial 
reports and prospectuses for stock offerings, and consequently dismissed 
that claim.43 In so holding, the court stated: 
The Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank makes clear that the 
policy undergirding it is to constrict the ambit of private actions under 
Section lO(b) and to thereby reduce the number of parties implicated by 
that statute. Only primary violators, i.e., those who make a material 
misstatement or omission or commit a manipulative act, are subject to 
private suit under Section 10(b) . 
. . . The Court rules that the [complaint's] allegations that Price 
Waterhouse reviewed and approved the quarterly financial statements and 
the Prospectuses do not constitute the making of a material misstatement; 
at most, the conduct constitutes aiding and abetting and is thus not 
cognizable under Section lO(b). Because Price Waterhouse did not 
actually engage in the reporting of the financial statements and 
Prospectuses, but merely reviewed and approved them, the statements are 
not attributable to Price Waterhouse and thus Price Waterhouse cannot be 
found liable for making a material misstatement.44 
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank of Denver that 
section lO(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or 
40 Kendall Square, 868 F. Supp. at 26-28. 
41 Id. 
42 See id. 
43 Id. at 28. 
44 Id. (citations omitted) (first emphasis added). 
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omission), "45 the court concluded that, in order to be liable as a primary 
violator, the defendant must actually make a material misstatement or 
omission.'6 The court concluded that Price Waterhouse did not make the 
misstatements contained in the fmancial statements and prospectuses 
because those documents, and the misstatements contained therein, were 
not "attributable" to Price Waterhouse.47 Accordingly, the court held that 
the plaintiffs' claims based on the fmandal statements and prospectuses 
could not go forward.48 
In Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP:9 the plaintiffs brought suit against 
Ernst & Young, another of the ''big five" accounting firms, for an alleged 
primary violation of section IO(b). The violation alleged was that Ernst & 
Young had given "private approval of the information contained in a press 
release"50 that was issued ''with a notation that the information [was] 
unaudited and without mention of [the company's] outside auditor."51 The 
Second Circuit began by reviewing the approaches taken by several courts 
since the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver.52 After 
concluding that Central Bank of Denver mandates the use of the "bright 
line" test,53 the court stated: 
We therefore agree with the district court that holding Ernst & Young 
primarily liable under the Act "in spite of its clearly tangential role in the 
alleged fraud would effectively revive aiding and abetting liability under' 
a different name, and would therefore run afoul of the Supreme Court's 
holding in Central Bank. ,,54 
Like the district court in Kendall Square, the Second Circuit held that a 
secondary actor must actually make the material misstatement or omission 
45 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 177 (1994). 
46 Kendall Square, 868 F. Supp. at 28. 
" ld. 
"ld. _ 
49 Wrightv. Ernst & YoungLLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2dCir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1104 (1999). 
50 ld. at 171. 
5\ ld. 
52 See id. at 174-75. 
53 The court so concluded because it reasoned that Central Bank a/Denver re-
quires that the defendant actually make the misstatement or omission to be held 
liable under section 10(b) and rule IOb-5. The court determined that, of the two 
tests, only the "bright line" test actually imposed such a requirement. See id. 
54 ld. at 175 (quoting Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 97 ClV. 2189(SAS), 
1997 WL 563782, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997». 
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in order for its conduct to rise to the level of a primary violation. In 
addition, the court concluded that "the misrepresentation must be attributed 
to that specific actor at the time of public dissemination"55 before that actor 
could be liable as a primary violator. 
While attempting to answer what it means to make a misstatement or 
omission, the court left unanswered another question: how does one 
determine whether the misrepresentation has been "attributed" to the 
secondary actor? To say that the misstatement or omission must be 
"attributed" to the secondary actor provides no more guidance than to 
simply reiterate that the secondary actor must actually make the 
misstatement or omission in order to be held liable. Again, like Kendall 
Square, the court seems to have intuitively determined which statements 
were actually made by the defendants without articulating a test by which 
it arrived at its determination. 
Other courts have applied the "bright line" test. In In re MTC 
Electronics Technologies Shareholders Litigation,56 for example, plaintiff 
shareholders brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York, alleging that MTC had made false 
misrepresentations. 57 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the company 
falsely stated in press statements and SEC filings that the company had 
secured agreements to provide cellular phone service and related equipment 
to customers in China.58 When it was revealed that no such agreements 
existed, MTC Electronics' stock price plummeted,59 and those shareholders 
injured by the price drop sued various company officers, the underwriters 
for the company's stock offerings (R.I. Meyers), and the company's 
accounting firm (DBO Dunwoody).60 
The plaintiffs alleged that R.I. Meyers was a primary violator of 
section IO(b) and rule lOb-5 for participating in the drafting and 
dissemination of the company's November 1991 prospectus for its public 
offering, and for disseminating a research report on the company that 
contained allegedly false statements made by R.J. Meyers.61 The court held 
55 Id. 
56 In re MTC Elecs. Tech. S'holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974 (B.D.N.Y. 1995), 
vacated in part on reconsideration by, 993 F. Supp. 160 (B.D.N.Y. 1997). 
57 Id. at 977. 
" Id. at 977-78 (noting that the price of the stock went from $5 per share to $30 
per share after the public statements). 
59Id. at 978. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 978, 987. 
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that a suit could not be maintained against H.J. Meyers for having 
participated in the drafting and dissemination of the prospectUs, but that a 
suit could be maintained against H.I. Meyers for its allegedly false 
statements made in a research report that it had disseminated.62 Again, like 
the courts in Kendall Square and Wright, the MTC Electronics court 
determined that the secondary actor must actually make the misstatement 
or omission to be held liable. The court did not, however, articulate a 
standard by which other courts and secondary actors could determine when 
such a statement has been made by the secondary actor. 
Similarly, the court held that a suit could be maintained against DBO 
Dunwoody based on its issuance of an unqualified audit opinion.63 Like the 
court in Kendall Square,64 the court in MTC Electronics concluded that 
because an auditor actually makes statements in its audit opinion, the 
auditor can be held liable as a primary violator if those statements turn out 
to be false or misleading.6s 
In analyzing the various claims against these parties and the confusion 
of the lower courts regarding what constitutes a primary violation, the court 
made the following statement, which has been used by courts66 and 
commentators61 to articulate the "bright line" test and the reasoning behind 
it: 
[I]f Central Bank is to have any meaning, a defendant must actually make 
a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 
1 OCb). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and 
no matter how substantial that aid may be, it is 1I0t enough to trigger 
liability under Section IO(b).68 
Still, like Kendall Square and Wright,69 the MTC Electronics court 
correctly asserted that the misstatement or omission must be made by the 
secondary actor, but failed to articulate how one determines whether the 
secondary actor made the misstatement or omission. In so doing, the court 
illustrated the conceptual strength and weakness of the "bright line" test. 
62 ld. at 987. 
631d. at 988. 
64 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
65 MTC Elecs., 898 F. Supp. at 988. 
66 See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998). 
61 See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 10, at 725. 
68 MTC Elecs., 898 F. Supp. at 987 (emphasis added). 
" See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text. 
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In summary, the "bright line" test is not really a test at all. Instead, it 
is more ofa statement: In order to be a primary violator of rule lOb-S, the 
secondary actor must actually make the misstatement or omission in 
question. While that statement is correct, it provides no additional guidance 
to the investment community beyond what the Supreme Court provided in 
Central Bank of Denver. Accordingly, a standard is needed for determining 
when a secondary actor has actually made the misstatement or omission 
and should therefore be subject to liability under rule lOb-S. 
Further, while the "bright-line" test usually arrives at the right answer, . 
it does not provide an analytical framework that can be applied to other 
cases to determine whether a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level 
of a primary violation of section IO(b) and rule lOb-S. For example, in 
MTC Electronics, the court stated that "a defendant must actually make a 
false or misleading statement in order to be [a primary violator]."7o Further, 
in Kendall Square, the court held that "[0 ]nly primary violators, i.e., those 
who TYUlke a material misstatement or omission ... are subject to private 
suit under Section IO(b)."71 These cases answer the first question by 
concluding that Central Bank of Denver and the language of section 1O(b) 
require that a secondary actor must actually make the misstatement or 
omission in order to be held primarily liable. Nonetheless, they leave 
unanswered how one determines whether the secondary actor "made" the 
statement. Part ill of this Note proposes a standard by which this question 
may be answered." 
B. The "Substantial Participation" Test 
Following Central Bank of Denver, a number of courts have held that, 
in order to be a primary violator under section 1O(b) and rule lOb-S, the 
secondary actor need not actually make the material misstatement or 
omission (as in the "bright line" test), but may be held liable for 
participating in the fraud in some "substantial" way.73 This has come to be 
known as the "substantial participation" test. 74 
70 MTC Elecs., 898 F. Supp. at 987. 
71 In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. 
Mass. 1994). 
72 See infra notes 113-36 and accompanying text. 
73 See Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. 
Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. 
Supp. 960, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
74 Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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A famous case applying the "substantial participation" test is In re 
ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation,'S which resulted from the bankruptcy of 
ZZZZ Best Co., Inc., once the nation's largest carpet cleaning company. 
The company's founder and largest shareholder had engaged in a scam to 
pass the company off as being extremely successful and was ''ultimately 
convicted and imprisoned for fraud and embezzlement. ",6 The plaintiffs in 
the case sued, among many others, the company's auditor, Ernst & Young. 
They alleged that Ernst & Young had violated section I O(b) and rule IOb-S 
by issuing a review report" on certain interim fmancial information 
released by the company and by its involvement in the creation, review, 
and issuance of some thirteen other public statements released by the 
company and others.'8 These suspect statements did not contain any 
indication that Ernst & Young was involved in their issuance. '9 
Ernst & Young conceded that it made the review report and that it 
could be liable as a primary violator provided the other elements were met; 
however, Emst & Young argued that it did not make the other thirteen 
statements, and thus these statements could not lead to a primary 
violation.80 The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California began its analysis by noting that "in Central Bank, the Supreme 
Court's opinion makes clear that more than simply knowing assistance with 
the underlying fraudulent scheme is required for Section lO(b) liability.,,81 
However, relying on pre-Central Bank of Denver authority, the court 
disagreed with Ernst & Young's position82 and held that "anyone intricately 
involved in [the] creation [of public statements such as those at issue] ... 
should be held liable under Section lO(b)/Rule IOb_S."83 
Dannenberg v. Paine Webber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. 
Securities Litigation )84 is another case where the "substantial participation" 
75 ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 960. 
76 ld. at 963. 
77 A review report is a report issued on some type offmanciaI information when 
less than an audit has been performed. A review report provides less assurance than 
does an audit and accompanying opinion. See WHITTINGTON & PANY, supra note 
39, at 719-24. 
78 ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 964. 
79 ld. at 965,968. 
80 ld. 
81 ld. at 969. 
82 Ernst & Young argued for an application of the "bright line" test. See id. at 
968. 
B] ld. at 970. 
"Darmenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (Ill re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig.), 
50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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test was used. Dannenberg involved disappointed investors who brought 
suit against Deloitte & Touche (another "big-five" accounting finn), 
underwriters, and others for alleged violations of section IO(b) and rule 
lOb-5 after the company's stock lost substantially all its value. BS The 
complaint alleged that the accountants were primary violators because they 
had reviewed a duplicitous letter to the SEC, had consulted the company 
about the letter, and had drafted and edited another such letter.86 Though 
both letters were issued by the company and not by Deloitte & Touche, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]his evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
primary cause of action under section I O(b) and, as a result, Central Bank 
does not absolve Deloitte."87 
Several other cases have also concluded that substantial participation 
in a primary violation constitutes a primary violation. In Cashman v. 
Coopers & Lybrand,88 the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois held that Coopers & Lybrand could be liable under 
section IO(b) and rule lOb-5 for "play[ing] a central role in the drafting and 
formation of the alleged misstatements."89 Further, in Phillips v. Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., 90 the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York held that the underwriter could be liable for "actively 
participat[ing] in formulating the language of the prospectus .... even 
though the Prospectus was published in the name of the issuer."91 
The "substantial participation" test can fairly be stated as follows: a 
secondary actor who substantially participates in the production of 
documents or other materials that contain misstatements or omissions may 
be held liable as a primary violator of rule I Ob-5. This characterization of 
rule IOb-5 liability is at great variance with the "bright line" test and with 
the Supreme Court's opinion in Central Bank a/Denver. 
First, as to the differences between the "bright line" test and the 
"substantial participation" test, a comparison of ZZZZ Best and Kendall 
Square is instructive. The facts of ZZZZ Best are very similar to the facts 
of Kendall Square.92 In both cases, the companies' auditors were accused 
8S See id. at 620. 
B6 See id. at 627-29. 
87Id. at 628 n.3. 
88 Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
B9 Id. at 432. 
90 Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 
108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997). 
91Id. at 316. 
92 Compare supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text with supra notes 75-79 
and accompanying text. 
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of section I O(b) and rule lOb-S violations based upon tbeir issuance of 
audit or review reports and tbeir participation in various otber public 
statements tbat were not attributed to them in any way.93 In botb Kendall 
Square and ZZZZ Best, it was agreed tbat tbe reports released by tbe 
auditors could be the basis of a primary violation cause of action, provided 
that tbe otber elements were met.94 Thus, the "bright line" and tbe 
"substantial participation" tests are in agreement insofar as tbese types of 
statements can amount to a primary violation. 
The rift between tbe two tests arises in the context of the auditors' 
participation in otber public statements tbat were in no way attributed to 
tbem. Using tbe "bright line" test, the court in Kendall Square found that 
after Central Bank of Denver a secondary actor must actually make the 
misstatement or omission in order to be held liable as a primary violator.95 
Conversely, tbe court in ZZZZ Best ignored tbe Supreme Court's mandate 
tbat section lO(b) "prohibits onlytbe making of a material misstatement (or 
omission),"96 and concluded tbat a secondary actor could be held liable as 
a primary violator for participation in the preparation of company material, 
whetber or not tbey were actually made by the secondary actor.97 This 
decision was obviously not based on an analysis of tbe elements of a 
primary violation, but on tbe court's feelings regarding fairness, which is 
demonstrated by tbe court's statement that Ernst & Young "should be 
[held] liable under Section lO(b)lRule lOb_S."98 Surely, to arrive at this 
conclusion tbe court contemplated policy considerations. However, as tbe 
Supreme Court stated in Central Bank of Denver, "[t]he issue ... is not 
whetber imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good 
policy but whetber aiding and abetting is covered by the statute."99 
93 See In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 27 (D. 
Mass. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 964-65 (C.D. Cal. 
1994). 
94 The court in Kendall Square held that this was the case as part of its ruling, 
see Kendall Square, 868 F. Supp. at 29, while defendant Ernst & Young conceded 
in ZZZZ Best that it could be liable if the other elements were met, see ZZZZ Best, 
864 F. Supp. at 965. 
95 Kendall Square, 868 F. Supp. at 28. 
96 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 177 (1994). 
97 See ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 970. 
98 Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that the defendants "should" be 
liable (a legislative decision) and then proceeded to fmd a way to hold them liable 
(similar to the legislature enacting a statute to remedy a perceived wrong). 
99 Cent. Banko/Denver, 511 U.S. at 177. 
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Accordingly, the ZZZZ Best court exceeded the bounds of the statute and 
the Supreme Court's opinion. 
Further, the previously discussed cases demonstrate that courts using 
the "substantial participation" test ignore the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Central BankofDenverand the language of the statute, thereby "reviv[ing] 
aider and abettor liability under a different name. "lOll This fact is further 
illustrated by comparing an aiding and abetting cause of action with the 
"substantial participation" test. 
In Central Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court noted that the Tenth-
Circuit identified the elements of an aiding and abetting cause of action as 
follows: "( I) a primary violation of § 1O(b); (2) recklessness [or 
lmowledge] by the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary 
violation; and (3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the 
aider and abettor."101 For purposes ofthis Note, these elements will be used 
in comparison to the "substantial participation" test, because they are 
representative of the elements used in the other circuits for an aiding and 
abetting cause of action. 102 In most cases there will be a primary violation, 
for example, by the issuer of the security. Further, recklessness (or 
lmowledge) on the part of the secondary actor still needs to be shown under 
both aiding and abetting and primary causes of action. Accordingly, the 
distinction between aiding and abetting and the "substantial participation" 
test hinges on the difference between "substantial assistance" and 
"substantial participation." 
100 Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 97 CIV. 2189(SAS), 1997 WL 563782, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 
101 Cent. Bank oj Denver, 511 U.S. at 168 (citing First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891,898-903 (10th Cir. 1992)). 
102 See, e.g., Levinev. Diarnanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); 
K & S P'ship v. Cant'! Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. 
Rosenberg, 943 F.2d485, 495 (4thCir. 1991); Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 
F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Schlitke v. Seafrrst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th 
Cir.1989); Schnebergerv. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477,1480 (11th Cir. 1988); Moore 
v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 
F.2d 774, 777 (lstCir. 1983); lIT, Int'I Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,922 
(2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 
1978). The Federal Circuit for the District of Columbia never directly recognized 
aiding and abetting liability, but suggested that it would likely do so in Zoelsch v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit 
applied a test different from those used in the other circuits in that it required that 
the aider and abettor "commit one of the 'manipulative or deceptive' acts 
prohibited under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5." Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 
F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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Clearly, the difference here is more a matter of semantics than legal 
substance. As a practical matter, juries and judges will be unable to 
distinguish between "assistance" and "participation," and secondary actors 
once liable as aiders and abettors now become liable as "primary 
violators." Surely this result is not what the Supreme Court intended in 
striking down aiding and abetting liability. Thus, the court in Wright was 
correct in concluding that adherence to the "substantial participation" test 
"would effectively revive aiding and abetting liability under a different 
name, and would therefore run afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Central Bank."I03 
While the "substantial participation" test seems to be aiding and 
abetting liability in primary violator's clothing, many courts and 
commentators have been more than willing to use this test to hold 
secondary actors liable under section IO(b) and rule IOb-5.'04 This is 
disturbing for two reasons. First, judicial use of the less rigorous 
"substantial participation" test after Central Bank of Denver creates 
uncertainty for future actors. It is a fundamental principle of the American 
legal system that courts are bound to follow the decisions of a higher court. 
Without this rule, courts' decisions cannot be relied upon as standards of 
conduct and actors are uncertain which actions can lead to liability and 
which cannot. For example, following Central Bank o/Denver, a securities 
lawyer or an accountant might assume that he or she will ouly be liable for 
misstatements or omissions that he or she actually made and not 
misstatements or omissions made by others. However, to this person's 
surprise and chagrin, it may become clear that even though the Supreme 
Court has held that aiding and abetting liability does not exist, lOS a court 
may still hold secondary actors liable under an "aiding and abetting" -type 
theory. This type of uncertainty is something the law should strive to avoid, 
as it causes costs to society with no reciprocal benefit. Unfortunately, this 
is exactly the situation that has developed following the Central Bank 0/ 
Denver decision. 
Second, courts have for the most part adopted the "substantial parti-
- cipation" test with very little thought or discussion,106 and the com; 
IOJ Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999) (quotingWrightv. Emst&YoungLLP,No. 97 CIV. 
2189(SAS), 1997 WL 563782, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,1997». 
104 See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text. 
105 Cent. Banko/Denver, 511 U.S. at 177. 
106 See, e.g., Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. 
Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that "the plaintiffs' 
complaint clearly alleges" a primary violation by a secondary actor without 
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mentators who argue for an expansive test such as the "substantial 
participation" test argue mainly on policy grounds lO7-an argument that the 
Supreme Court specifically foreclosed in the Central Bank 0/ Denver 
decision.108 The Court explicitly stated that "[t]he issue ... is not whether 
imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but 
whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute. "109 
The important point here is that the proper role of the courts is to 
interpret laws as they are written, and only ifpolicy arguments are helpful 
in that context should they be referenced. However, when the language of 
the statute is clear on its face, then the courts are duty-bound to interpret 
the statute as written, and the legislature is the proper place for those 
disappointed with the statute's application to voice their policy arguments. 
As Alexander Hamilton appropriately stated in the Federalist Paper No. 78, 
"The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be 
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would 
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative 
body. "110 Those who advocate that policy justifications dictate that the 
courts expand the implied cause of action under section I O(b) and rule lOb-
s through use of the "substantial participation" test essentially argue that 
explaining the reasons for the "clarity" or distinguishing between "substantial 
participation" and mere "aiding and abetting"). 
107 See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 10, at 727-32. 
108 Cent. Banko/Denver, 511 U.S. at 188. In addressing the policy arguments 
forwarded by the Commission, the Court stated: 
The SEC points to various policy arguments in support of the IOb-5 
aiding and abetting cause of action. It argues, for example, that the aiding 
and abetting cause of action deters secondary actors from contributing 
to fraudulent activities and ensures that defrauded plaintiffs are made 
whole. 
Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and 
structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that 
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result "so bizarre" that 
Congress could not have intended it. That is not the case here. 
Extending the 10b-5 cause of action to aiders and abettors no doubt 
makes the civil remedy more far reaching, but it does not follow that the 
objectives of the statute are better served. Secondary liability for aiders and 
abettors exacts costs that may disserve the goals of fair dealing and 
efficiency in the securities markets. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
109 Id. at 177. 
110 THEFEDERALISTNo. 78, at 230 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 
2d ed. 1966). 
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the courts should "substitut[ e] ... their pleasure to that of the legislative 
body." II I 
This result cannot be tolerated in a government that relies on the 
separation of powers, which envisions different governmental bodies with 
distinct roles. Unlike the legislature, the courts have neither the resources 
nor the time to thoroughly examine these policy arguments and thereby 
arrive at an informed decision. The current security statutes represent the 
legislature's position on these issues, and, while it is desirable that security 
fraud be punished, the Supreme Court has rightly concluded, based on the 
text of the statute, that "not every instance of fmancial unfairness 
constitutes fraudulent activity under § 1O(b )."112 
m. IN THE WAKE OF CENTRAL BANK OF DENVER, 
WHO IS A PRIMARY VIOLATOR? 
Because the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver 
requires that a secondary actor be a primary violator to be held liable under 
a section I O(b) and rule IOb-5 cause of action, I J3 it is necessary to evaluate 
what constitutes a primary violation in the typical sense. While there are 
varying formulations of what constitutes a primary violation of section 
1 O(b) and rule IOb-5, generally there are two broad categories under which 
a primary violation can occur: misstatements and omissions. 114 Although 
the elements vary slightly depending on the category of the violation, 1 15 the 
III ld. 
112 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980). 
I J3 See supra Parts I and II. 
114 Rule IOb-5 also forbids the use of "device[s], schemers], or artificers] to 
defraud," and prohibits "engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business" that 
defrauds. 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (2000). The Supreme Court has seemingly 
categorized anything that is not a misstatement or an omission as a manipulation, 
which has been defmed as a term of art that covers wash sales, matched orders, and 
the like. Prentice, supra note 10, at 699 n.30 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462, 472-74 (1977); and Ernst & Ernslv. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 
(1976». Consequently, courts and commentators focus on misstatements and 
omissions as the two main categories of primary violations by secondary actors. 
See, e.g., Wrightv. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1104 (1999); In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 
26 (D. Mass. 1994); Prentice, supra note 10, at 699. Likewise, this Note focuses 
only on misstatements and omissions in determining who is a primary violator. 
115 See generally Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Elements a/Recovery Under Rule 
IOb-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 
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following elements are common to both categories: (I) a misstatement or 
omission made by the defendant,116 (2) that is material, ll7 (3) made in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities118 (4) with a degree of 
scienter,119 (5) that is actually relied upon,120 (6) and justifiably relied 
upon,121 (7) and that causesl22 (8) damages.123 Further, in the case of an 
omission, the defendant must also have had a duty to disclose the non-
public information and must have in some way made a fraudulent use of 
the information, such as through trading or tipping.124 For the purposes of 
determining when a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a 
primary violation, it is not necessary to discuss every element of a primary 
S.C. L. REv. 653 (1975). 
116 Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2000); see 2 HAzEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.2.1, at468. 
117 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); Stransky, 51 F.3d at 
1331; 2 HAzEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.1, at 466-67; see, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 
F.2d 457, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1965). 
118 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); Stransky, 51 F.3dat 1331; 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-
5(c)(2000); 2 HAzEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.1, at 465-66; see Blue Chips Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
119 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 193 (1976); Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331; 2 HAzEN, supra note 14, § 13.2, 
at 460, § 13.2.1, at 467, § 13.4; see Campbell, supra note 115, at 655-64,685-89. 
See generally James D. Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and 
Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 
HASTINGS LJ. 569 (1977). 
120 Basic, 485 U.S. at 243; Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331; 2 HAzEN, supra note 14, 
§ 13.2.1, at 468; see 2 id. § 13.5B; Campbell, supra note 115, at 674-83, 692-93, 
701; see, e.g., List, 340 F.2d at 457. 
121 Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987); see 2 
HAzEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.1, at 468, § 13.5B, at 531-34, § 13.12; Campbell, 
supra note 115, at 664-69, 689-91, 700; see, e.g., Teamsters Local 282 Pension 
Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 529-30 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Zobrist v. Coal-X, 
Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (lOth Cir. 1983». 
122 Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331; 2 HAzEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.1, at468; see 2 
id. § 13.6; see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 
(1972); Bastian v. Petren Res. Co., 892 F.2d 680, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1990). 
123 Stransky, 51 F.3dat 1331; 2 HAzEN,supra note 14, § 13.2.1, at466, 468; see 
2 id. § 13.7. 
124 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 65\-53 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646, 653-55, 661-64 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 
(1980); 2 HAzEN, supra note 14, § 13.9-.10. 
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violation in detail because many of the elements will apply identically to 
primary and secondary actors alike. Accordingly, this Note discusses only 
those elements relevant to determining whether a secondary actor's conduct 
rises to the level of a primary violation: (1) misstatement or omission; (2) 
scienter; and (3) reliance. 
A. Defining Misstatement or Omission 
The Central Bank of Denver decision mandates that the secondary actor 
actually make the misstatement or omission to be liable as a primary 
violator under section 1 O(b) and rule 1 Ob-5. 125 Because the secondary actor 
must actually make the misstatement or omission, it is most likely that the 
Court in Central Bank of Denver intended the use of the "bright line" test 
over the use of the "substantial participation" test. 126 Thus, the question left 
to be answered is how one determines when a secondary actor has actually 
made the misstatement or omission. Ibis Note proposes that the test to 
determine whether a secondary actor actually made the misstatement or 
omission should be whether a reasonable investor would conclude that the 
secondary actor made the misstatement or omission in question. 
For many reasons, this standard provides a workable and logical guide 
for judges, juries, and secondary actors in determining whether a 
misstatement or omission has been "made" for the purposes of classifying 
the secondary actor as a primary violator under section lO(b) and rule lOb-
5. First, this standard should not cause judges, juries, or secondary actors 
trouble or confusion in its application because they are already accustomed 
to applying this type of reasonable investor standard with respect to other 
elements of recovery in an action under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. For 
example, the Supreme Court has announced a reasonable investor standard 
in the context of judging materiality, holding that a misstatement or 
omission is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder [or investor] would consider it important."127 Accordingly, 
there is no reason to conclude that the reasonable investor standard 
proposed herein would be unacceptably confusing when a similar standard 
has been successfully applied to gauge the materiality of a statement or 
omission. 
125 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First mterstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 177 (1994). 
126 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text. 
127 TSC mdus., Inc. v. Northway, mc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (assessing the 
standard in the rule 14a-9 context); accord Basic, mc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
231-32 (1988) (assessing the standard in the rule 10b-5 context). 
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Further, the standard proposed herein is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver and the language of section 
I O(b), because the secondary actor must actually make the misstatement or 
omission in order to be a primary violator. Unlike the· "substantial 
participation" test, the proposed "reasonable investor" standard does not 
revive aiding and abetting liability under a different name. Instead, it 
addresses some of the fairness concerns underlying the "substantial 
participation" test, albeit within the textual limitations of the statute. 
Speeifically, holding a secondary actor liable only when both (1) all of the 
elements of a rule IOb-5 action have been satisfied, and (2) a reasonable 
investor would conclude that such misstatement or omission was made by 
the secondary actor is fair to plaintiffs and within the bounds of section 
I O(b). If a reasonable investor would not conclude that the secondary actor 
actually made the misstatement or omission, one might still argue that in 
. fairness the secondary actor should be held liable. The statute, however, 
dictates that the secondary actor not be held liable. As such, the standard 
proposed herein maintains the proper role of the judiciary as interpreters of 
legislative enactments. 
Though a standard similar to the proposed "reasonable investor" 
standard is already implicit under the "bright line" test, to eliminate any 
doubt it is necessary that the Supreme Court take up another case on this 
issue and directly and unequivocally state the proper standard. Until then, 
a secondary actor's liability under section I O(b) and rule IOb-5 will be a 
function of the circuit in which the secondary actor commits the alleged 
violation. 
B. Central Bank of Denver's Implicationfor the Scienter Requirement 
Scienter is discussed here not because it is helpful in determining 
whether a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a primary 
violation, but because Central Bank of Denver has important implications 
for secondary actors regarding the scienter requirement. The Supreme 
Court's elimination of aider and abettor liability in Central Bank of Denver 
demonstrates its desire to limit liability under section IO(b) and rule lOb-5. 
The statutory language does not include recklessness, nor does fraud 
typically include recklessness. Yet the Court has twice specifically reserved 
the question whether recklessness can constitute scienter; 128 If the Court 
follows its recent pattern of strict construction of section 1 O(b) and rule 
I2S See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). 
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IOb-5 as in Central Bank of Denver, it will likely rule that recklessness 
does not constitute scienter. 
If the Court were to so hold, this ruling would have a profound impact 
on secondary actor liability, because secondary actors almost never act with 
the intent to defraud. Truly, "it is highly unlikely that an accounting fIrm's 
certifIcation of inaccurate fmancial statements resulting from an inadequate 
audit is attributable to a desire to defraud investors."129 Accordingly, the 
ambit of section I O(b) and rule IOb-5 liability for secondary actors may be 
receptive to another shock wave like the one resulting from Central Bank 
of Denver. 
c. Why the Reliance Requirement Should be Left Alone 
In Central Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]ere we 
to allow the aiding and abetting action proposed in this case, the defendant 
could be liable without any showing [of reliance]."130 This statement 
illustrates that the Supreme Court believes that reliance is vital to causes 
of action for primary violations of section I O(b) and rule lOb-5. 
Accordingly, commentators and courts have looked to reliance as the 
crucial element for determining when a secondary actor's conduct could 
violate section lO(b) and rule lOb-5.131 
Reliance is a very complicated element of recovery in actions under 
rule IOb-5.132 This has led to many complicated analyses based on various 
ideas of reliance, such as fraud-on-the-market, efficient versus non-
efficient markets, and the inference of reliance from other elements such 
as materiality. 133 However, these analyses ignore the question that must be 
central to any section IO(b) and rule IOb-5 claim against a secondary 
actor-namely, did the secondary actor actually make the misstatement or 
omission in question? Consequently, the already overburdened reliance 
129 Fischel, supra note 2, at 108 n.152. 
130 Cent Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U. S. 164, 180 (1994). The Court's statement makes perfect sense. If the defendant 
has not made a misstatement or omission, there is nothing upon which a plaintiff 
can rely. 
13I See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 10, at 737 (citing Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. 
Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (lOth Cir. 1996)); Lisa Klein Wager & John E. Failla, 
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.-The 
Beginning of an End, or Will Less Lead to More?, 49 Bus. LAW. 1451, 1461 
(1994). 
132 See 2 HAzEN, supra note 14, § 13.5B. 
133 See id. 
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element134 should not be given the additional task (which is one that it 
cannot complete satisfactorily) of determining when a secondary actor's 
conduct rises to the level of a primary violation of section I O(b) and rule 
10b-S. 
Further, altering the analysis under reliance is unnecessary if it is 
determined that the secondary actor made the statement under the test 
herein proposed. If the secondary actor made the statement, then the 
reliance analysis can be conducted as it would in any other section 1 O(b) 
and rule IOb-S case. Ifnot, a reliance analysis is unnecessary for the section 
1O(b) and rule lOb-S claims against the secondary actor because, as the 
Supreme Court stated in Central Bank of Denver, section I O(b) and rule 
IOb-S ''prohibit[ ] only the making of a material misstatement (or 
omission)."135 
Finally, a statement made in ZZZZ Best illustrates the type of flawed 
analysis that can result if the courts look to "reliance" as the test to 
determine when a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a primary 
violation. The court stated that "[w]hile the investing public may not be 
able to reasonably attribute the additional misstatements and omissions to 
[the secondary actor], the securities market still relied on those public 
statements and anyone intricately involved in their creation and the 
resulting deception should be liable under Section lO(b)lRule IOb_S."136 
This statement highlights how the Supreme Court's mandate that the 
secondary actor actnally make the misstatement or omission can easily get 
lost in the shuffle of an analysis based on reliance. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver 
unequivocally abolished aider and abettor liability under section I O(b) and 
rule IOb-S, but lower courts and commentators have been unable to agree 
upon the point at which a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a 
primary violation. Courts and commentators have proposed and advanced . 
two rival tests: the "bright line" test and the "substantial participation" test. 
The "bright line" test is more faithful to the language of section I O(b) and 
Central Bank of Denver, and thus must be preferred to the "substantial 
13' The complexity of the reliance element and its inconsistent application make 
this element ill-suited to answer the additional question whether the secondary 
actor actually made the misstatement or omission in question. 
135 Cent. Banko/Denver, 511 U.S. at 177. 
136 In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (c.n. Cal. 1994). 
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participation" test, which is little more than aiding and abetting liability 
under a different name. However, for ease of application and to provide a 
proper analytical framework, the "bright line" test should be modified to 
defmitively state that a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a 
primary violation if a reasonable investor would construe the misstatement 
or omission to be made by the secondary actor, and if all the other elements 
for recovery are met. Such a test would adhere to the statutory language of 
section 1O(b) and provide a logical test by which secondary actors could 
guide their conduct, while also promoting fairness to investors. 
